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3 
CHAE CHAN PING AT 125: AN INTRODUCTION 
KIT JOHNSON* 
 
It was 125 years ago that the U.S. Supreme Court decided Chae Chan 
Ping v. United States, also known as the Chinese Exclusion Case.1 This 
symposium issue is dedicated to exploring the continued relevance of this 
seminal immigration decision. 
Chae Chan Ping was a Chinese migrant who first came to the United 
States in 1875.2 After living in in this country for twelve years, he took a 
brief trip back to China.3 Wanting to make sure he could return to the 
United States, he departed only after receiving advance permission to return 
in the form of a reentry certificate, a requirement introduced by the 1882 
Chinese Exclusion Act.4 But while Chae Chan Ping was sailing back to the 
United States, Congress revoked all reentry certificates with the Scott Act.5 
Congress took this action on October 1, 1888, with the law going into effect 
immediately. One week later, on October 8, Chae Chan Ping landed in San 
Francisco and presented his certificate. Pursuant to the act of Congress, he 
was denied reentry to the United States, and he was detained onboard by his 
ship’s captain.6 He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in California 
federal court seeking permission to enter.7 That court held the detention 
lawful, and Chae Chan Ping appealed to the Supreme Court. 
In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Stephen Field, the Supreme 
Court held that Chae Chan Ping had no right to reenter the United States. 
The Court determined that Congress’s decision to revoke reentry 
certificates was “conclusive upon the judiciary.”8 This holding has since 
become known as the “plenary power doctrine,” and it has been 
foundational to constitutional immigration jurisprudence. Under this 
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 1. 130 U.S. 581 (1889). The full opinion is reprinted following this introduction. 
 2. Id. at 582.  
 3. Id.  
 4. Id. A copy of Chae Chan Ping’s reentry certificate is reprinted on page 2 of this 
symposium edition. 
 5. Id. at 582-83. Congress revoked all reentry certificates with the Scott Act. Id. 
 6. Id. at 582. Chae Chan Ping traveled from China to the United States on board the 
S.S. Belgic. A photo of the ship is reprinted on page 2 of this symposium edition.  
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 606. 
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doctrine, any law passed by Congress with respect to immigration, even 
those that would be unconstitutional if applied to citizens, is not subject to 
judicial challenge. For instance, as Chae Chan Ping itself noted, Congress 
would be free to write immigration laws to exclude individuals explicitly on 
the basis of race, even though Congress could not, of course, exclude U.S. 
citizens from opportunities on the basis of race. 
As for what happened to Chae Chan Ping after his final deportation and 
return to China, nothing is known. As for what to make of his Supreme 
Court case, the debate continues. This symposium volume contains an array 
of contributions to thinking about the plenary power doctrine and the legacy 
of Chae Chan Ping on American immigration law. 
In the first article, Professor David A. Martin argues that the importance 
of Chae Chan Ping lies in its reasons for deferring to the political branch 
on immigration issues.9 He emphasizes the Court’s conclusion that the 
federal government’s power to exercise immigration control was necessary 
for the nation to speak “with one voice on the world stage”10 in “realms 
touching upon foreign relations and potential national self-preservation.”11 
This was, Martin notes, a federalism issue. For, if the federal government 
did not control immigration, foreign affairs would be in the hands of what 
were then thirty-eight different states. Thus, the lesson of Chae Chan Ping, 
Martin argues, is about the nation speaking as one given that immigration 
laws “might need to be in the mix to respond to, or to help shape, actions 
that others are taking abroad.”12 Martin also points out that this deference 
does not give the political branches a blank check for immigration law. For 
one, he notes that courts frequently employ sub-constitutional means — 
such as statutory interpretation — in ways that “adhere more closely to 
constitutional values” than lawmakers may have even intended.13 And even 
more importantly, political bodies are responsive to political pressures. In 
the end, Martin concludes that Chae Chan Ping is a “call to roll up our 
sleeves and get to work in the political arena rather than the courts.”14 
Professor Kevin R. Johnson takes a different tack. Instead of focusing on 
the rationale of Chan Chan Ping, he examines its doctrinal durability in the 
                                                                                                                 
 9. David A. Martin, Why Immigration’s Plenary Power Doctrine Endures, 68 OKLA. 
L. REV. 29 (2015).  
 10. Id. at 37. 
 11. Id. at 41. 
 12. Id. at 47.  
 13. Id. at 51.  
 14. Id. at 55.  
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modern Supreme Court.15 He closely examines each of the Court’s most 
recent immigration decisions — including important denials of certiorari — 
from the 2009 through the 2013 terms. Johnson concludes that the plenary 
power doctrine espoused in Chae Chan Ping is “heading toward its ultimate 
demise.”16 He sees the Court moving away from a reliance on “immigration 
exceptionalism,” which is the idea that because of Chae Chan Ping 
immigration cases are just different.17 Instead, he finds that the Court has 
handled numerous immigration cases in “ordinary, standard, and 
unremarkable” ways. For instance, the contemporary Court has often 
resolved immigration cases through statutory interpretation18 and 
administrative deference, instead of relying on the constitutional approach 
of Chae Chan Ping. The result, Johnson notes, has been a trend to bring 
“immigration law more in line with conventional norms of judicial 
review.”19 Johnson’s comprehensive review of the period points to a new 
era of immigration unexceptionalism.  
Professor Michael Scaperlanda offers a direct critique of Chae Chan 
Ping’s plenary power doctrine.20 Scaperlanda argues that the Court erred in 
suggesting that the rights of the sovereign include an “absolute and 
unqualified right to exclude or deport aliens.”21 He characterizes the 
Court’s move as an error of “rejecting the universal in favor of the 
particular.”22 Scaperlanda goes on to argue that liberal political theory, 
popular among scholars, cannot provide an alternative answer to explain 
what criteria should govern the state’s control over migration as it makes 
the “opposite error by rejecting the particular in favor of the universal.”23 
Scaperlanda concludes that Christian tradition offers a third and more 
valuable narrative whereby “the universal dignity of the person is realized 
within particular political communities who achieve their own good 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, 2009-13: A New Era of 
Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 57 (2015). 
 16. Id. at 61.  
 17. Id. at 63-64.  
 18. It is important to note that both Professor Martin and Professor Johnson emphasize 
that statutory interpretation is a principal mechanism for judicial review of immigration laws 
despite the plenary power doctrine.  
 19. Johnson, supra note 15, at 65. 
 20. Michael Scaperlanda, Scalia’s Short Reply to 125 Years of Plenary Power, 68 
OKLA. L. REV. 119 (2015).  
 21. Id. at 125.  
 22. Id. at 129.  
 23. Id.  
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partially by their openness to outsiders in need of the resources they possess 
in abundance.”24  
The next set of articles considers aspects of the Chae Chan Ping decision 
beyond the plenary power doctrine.  
Professor Rose Cuison Villazor discusses the decision in terms of Chae 
Chan Ping’s unsuccessful claim that his reentry certificate25 amounted to a 
property right entitling him to admission into the United States.26 Villazor 
delves into the legal arguments actually raised by Chae Chan Ping at trial 
and on appeal as well as the government’s counter-arguments and the 
courts’ conclusions. She notes that Chae Chan Ping really claimed a right to 
“new property,” a concept the Supreme Court would not recognize for 
another eighty years.27 She concludes by emphasizing the connections 
between property law and immigration law, both of which regulate “who 
belongs in a particular space.”28 
Professor Victor Romero focuses on the author of Chae Chan Ping: 
Justice Stephen Field.29 He compares the majority opinion of Chae Chan 
Ping with Field’s dissent four years later in Fong Yue Ting v. United States. 
Romero finds in these opinions a struggle between Justice Field’s personal 
views on the effect of mass Chinese migration on the U.S. citizenry and his 
duty as a federal judge to protect the constitutional rights of individual 
migrants lawfully present in the United States regardless of their race or 
citizenship.30 Romero argues that Field’s personal struggle evidences a 
larger conflict in immigration law: the “tension between viewing 
immigrants as an undifferentiated mass and recognizing each immigrant as 
a person worthy of constitutional protection.”31 Romero finds further 
understanding of Justice Field’s decisions in social psychology research, 
which explains the perennial human inability to empathize with or 
understand large numbers. He concludes that immigrant rights advocates 
should recognize and work within the constraints on human empathy 
identified by social psychologists to “emphasize and guard against our 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Id. at 136.  
 25. See supra notes 4-6 and surrounding text. 
 26. Rose Cuison Villazor, Chae Chan Ping v. United States: Immigration as Property, 
68 OKLA. L. REV. 137 (2015). 
 27. Id. at 152-53.  
 28. Id. at 160.  
 29. Victor Romero, Elusive Equality: Reflections on Justice Field’s Opinions in Chae 
Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 165 (2015). 
 30. Id. at 166.  
 31. Id.  
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inherent parochialism” as Justice Field appeared to do in Fong Yue Ting 
notwithstanding his opinion in Chae Chan Ping.32 
In the final article of this symposium issue, Professor Margaret Taylor 
and I focus not on the legal implications of Chae Chan Ping but its rallying 
message that the federal government’s “highest duty” is to protect its 
people from “vast hordes” of migrants “crowding in upon us.”33 That 
message, we write, continues to echo in today’s response to mass migration, 
including the 2014 incarceration of undocumented mothers with children in 
a remote detention facility in Artesia, New Mexico.34 In particular, we 
critique the government’s use of expedited removal, its predetermination to 
deny claims of fear upon removal, its insistence on denying bond to those 
with potentially meritorious claims, and its position that due process does 
not protect women with children inside our borders.35 We conclude that 
these moves are the modern iteration of the fears of mass migration that 
permeated Chae Chan Ping.36 
In 1888, one Chinese man was denied entry to the United States. His 
faltering legal challenge sent him swiftly away from American shores. But 
his ghost has haunted American immigration law ever since. In 125 years, 
we still haven’t gotten over it: The acrid racism of the opinion, the brash 
sweeping aside of constitutional confines, and the crisp heartbreak of his 
seven-day-too-late return. As the papers in this symposium volume 
illustrate, Chae Chan Ping continues to fascinate, frustrate, and confound. 
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 33. Margaret H. Taylor & Kit Johnson, “Vast Hordes… Crowding in Upon Us”: The 
Executive Branch’s Response to Mass Migration and the Legacy of Chae Chan Ping, 68 
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 34. Id. at 190-93.  
 35. Id. at 193-206. 
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